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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LISA MARAKIS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20855 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent disputes the issue framed by appellant. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the issue is whether the 
physical contact requirement in the contract of uninsured 
motorist insurance between State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
(respondent) and Lisa Marakis (appellant) is consistent with 
legislative intent and public policy of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not refer to the 
record on appeal in support of numerous allegations. Respondent 
submits that the appellant's recitation of facts fails to 
accurately reflect the record presented to Judge Bunnell in the 
court below. Therefore, respondent will provide the court with 
a Statement of Facts supported by the record. 
However, one issue should be addressed at the outset. 
Appellant in her Statement of Facts goes to considerable 
lengths in describing the trial court's granting of a Rule 
60(b) motion which set aside a prior order granting Marakis' 
motion for summary judgment. In reciting these facts to the 
court here, the appellant appears to criticize the attorneys 
for defendant as well as the court. Because no error has been 
assigned on this ground, respondents would ignore the allega-
tions, but for the apparent criticism of the trial court in 
"surprisingly" granting respondent's motion pursuant to Rule 
6 0(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of 
Judge Bunnell's ruling in this regard, it should be noted that 
his exercise of discretion was supported by the fact that 
defense counsel had not become personally aware of plaintiff's 
pending motion prior to the granting of the initial order and 
that defendant's two attorneys had tried seven multi-dayed 
personal injury trials during the critical six week period when 
the motion was pending. The court was further informed that 
during this period of time, counsel for both parties to this 
appeal were involved in a trial for several days, and that 
appellant's counsel declined professional comity in personally 
informing defense counsel of his attempts to obtain a judgment 
without the court being fully briefed on the issues. (Affida-
vits of Ray Harding Ivie and Ray Phillips Ivie, R. 85-90). The 
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court ruled on defendant's motion to reconsider on July 11, 
1985. (R. 149-152). Defendant's lead counsel retired from the 
practice of law six weeks later due to health problems. 
Appellant claimed coverage in the court below pursuant 
to a contract of insurance between her grandparents and respon-
dent. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 155-158). 
The policy of insurance between appellant's grand-
parents and respondent provided for payment of damages for 
bodily injury that an insured is legally entitled to collect 
from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The 
policy defined uninsured motor vehicle to mean: 
A 'hit-and-run' land motor vehicle whose 
owner or driver remains unknown and which 
strikes: 
a. the insured or 
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying 
and causes bodily injury to the insured, 
(emphasis added) 
Appellant made claim to uninsured motorist benefits 
alleging that she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 
or about September 4, 1982. (Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 1-3). 
Appellant alleged that the accident occurred when her 
vehicle was forced from the road by an unidentified vehicle 
which the appellant further alleged left the scene of the 
accident. (Affidavit of Plaintiff Lisa Marakis, R. 45-46). 
That the only evidence which appellant could profer 
as to the existence of the unidentified vehicle would be the 
testimony of the appellant herself. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. 155-158). 
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The respondent insurance company admits that Lisa 
Marakis, appellant, as a permissive user of the insured auto-
mobile is an insured pursuant to the contract of insurance. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issue presented concerns the enforceability of 
the "physical contact requirement" as a condition precedent to 
an insurer's duty to indemnify an insured for damages sustained 
as the proximate result of negligence by a "hit-and-run" 
motorist. Appellant has never contended that the policy 
language is anything but clear and unequivocal in this regard. 
Rather, appellant seeks in this court and in the court below, 
to have the provision rendered unenforceable. Appellant's 
arguments are founded on legislative intent and public policy 
rationales. Therefore, the issues presented to the Supreme 
Court here are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court correctly discern the legis-
lature's intent in using the term "hit-and-run"; and 
2. Was the trial court correct in its determination 
that the public policy of the State of Utah requires the courts 
to enforce the provision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRESENT APPEAL IS MOOT 
In the court below, Judge Bunnell was asked to deter-
mine the legislature's intent in using the phrase "hit-and-run" 
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in Section 41-12-21.1, Utah Code Annotated, (Utah's Uninsured 
Motorist Statute). At the time of Judge Bunnell's decision, 
the legislature had not defined the scope or breadth of that 
term. However, the 1986 legislature specifically addressed the 
physical contact rule. In so doing, the legislature clarified 
their legislative intent in enacting the Uninsured Motorist 
Statute, and adopted as the public policy of the State of Utah 
a rule consistent with the one applied by Judge Bunnell in the 
present case. The new statutory language provides: 
When a covered person claims an uninsured 
motor vehicle under subsection (2)(b) (an 
unidentified motor vehicle which left the 
scene of an accident proximately caused by 
its operator) proximately caused an accident 
without touching the covered person or the 
vehicle occupied by the covered person, 
then the covered person shall show the 
existence of the other motor vehicle by 
clear and convincing evidence, which shall 
consist of more than the covered person's 
testimony. (Precise citation still uncertain. 
The above-quoted statutory language contained 
a working citation of 31A-22-305(5). A 
copy of the language as contained in Senate 
Bill 91 is included in respondent's brief 
and attached as Appendix A.) 
The above-quoted statutory language is entirely 
consistent with Judge Bunnell's ruling in the present case. 
The legislature has now adopted as the public policy of the 
State of Utah a moderate position which balances the competing 
interests which are reflected in the opinions of the various 
states which have reviewed the physical contact requirement. 
The Utah statute permits recovery by an insured only where the 
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existence of the phantom vehicle is established by clear and 
convincing proof, which must consist of more than the covered 
person's testimony. However, the legislature had also recog-
nized the possibility of fraud and collusion, as well as the 
difficulties inherent in defending actions arising out of 
automobile accidents involving non-contact "phantom vehicles", 
and of thus excluded mandatory coverage for such accidents in 
those instances where the existence of the phantom vehicle 
cannot be established by more than the covered person's testi-
mony* 
In the present case, the trial court specifically 
entered a finding of fact concerning this issue of proof. The 
court stated in paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact: 
That the only person known to plaintiff who 
witnessed the motor vehicle accident is the 
plaintiff herself. (Plaintiff's Responses 
to Defendant's Interrogatories, R. 25-26). 
Furthermore, plaintiff-appellant was asked the 
following question in interrogatories: 
15. Q: Please list the name, address and 
telephone number of each and every individual 
which plaintiff may or will call as a 
witness at the trial of this matter. 
The plaintiff/appellant responded: 
ANSWER: Presently, plaintiff plans to call 
the following people as witnesses. Names 
of others will be provided as they are 
determined: 
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1) Lisa Marakis, as to the facts of 
the accident, injuries, damages; 
2) Dr. Kim Christensen, East Carbon 
Medical Clinic, East Carbon, UT 84520, as 
to injuries and damages; 
3) Harold Jay Fowler, 108 8th West 
(Box 318) East Carbon, UT 84520, as to 
policy of insurance and damages and 
injuries; 
4) Mary Fowler, 108 8th West (Box 
318) East Carbon, UT 84520, as to policy of 
insurance and damages and injuries. 
(Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, R. 25-26) . 
As the responses to interrogatories indicate, the 
only person capable of testifying as to the existence of the 
non-contact vehicle is the plaintiff herself. The legislature 
has clarified the public policy underlying the Uninsured 
Motorist Statute in specifying that such proof will not be 
sufficient to establish a right to collect pursuant to a policy 
of insurance issued to satisfy the requirements of Utah's 
Uninsured Motorist Statute. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note the candid 
observation of appellant in her brief on appeal. On page 8 of 
appellant's brief, she sets forth the various type of uninsured 
motorist statutes enacted by the several states. Appellant 
states therein: 
The fourth, and most progressive, category 
consists of four states which allow the 
physical contact requirement to be waived 
if competent evidence exists to corroborate 
the claimant's account of the accident. 
(Appellant's Brief on Appeal, page 8). 
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State Farm does not dispute the extension of coverage 
to non-contact accidents where the existence of the fleeing 
vehicle can be sufficiently established. The physical contact 
requirement has been adopted not only by insurance companies in 
language contained in insurance contracts, but also by the 
legislatures or courts of the majority of states that have 
addressed the issue. However, the rationale behind the require-
ment must be examined. The purpose for requiring physical 
contact is not to provide an arbitrary gap in insurance coverage. 
Rather, it is to effectuate the public policy of stabilizing 
the rising costs of automobile insurance by preventing fraudu-
lent claims as well as barring those actions which are nearly 
impossible to defend due to the lack of physical evidence found 
at the scene of the accident. However, where the existence of 
the phantom vehicle can be conclusively determined by evidence 
consisting of more than the testimony of the insured themselves, 
the rationale ceases to exist and coverage should be afforded. 
To this extent, State Farm would agree with Marakis 
that a more progressive rule is emerging in the various states. 
While the original cases to be decided on this issue were 
polarized in terms of upholding the requirement or striking it 
down, the new moderate rule would preclude recovery in cases 
like the present one, but would permit claims where there is no 
serious question as to the presence of the non-contact accident. 
In the present case, the trial court was faced with a 
difficult task of discerning legislative intent where the 
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legislature was silent as to the definition of "hit-and-run" 
motor vehicles. The legislature has now clarified its position 
and adopted a public policy consistent with the trial court's 
decision in the present case. The new legislative directive 
serves to clarify this ambiguity in a way which serves the 
purposes of the general public in stabilizing the rising costs 
of automobile insurance, while at the same time permitting 
recovery in those circumstances which justify it. The legisla-
ture having now spoken, and the trial court's ruling being 
consistent therewith, respondent would respectfully submit that 
the issue is now moot. 
POINT II 
THE PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT CONTAINED 
IN THE POLICY OF INSURANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED 
ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. 
While respondent maintains that the recent clarifica-
tion by the Utah State Legislature has rendered the present 
appeal moot, the construction urged by appellant would be 
erroneous, even in the absence of the legislative directive. 
Initially, it must be remembered that a policy of 
insurance constitutes a contract, which should be enforced 
according to its terms unless it violates state law, principles 
of equity, or public policy. This rule of construction was 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in a previous case 
concerning the Uninsured Motorist Statute, Martin v. Christen-
sen, 454 P.2d 294 (1969). There the court stated : 
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There appears to be no ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in the provision just quoted, 
(prohibition against stacking of uninsured 
motorist policies) It being thus set forth 
as part of the insurance contract, in clear 
and understandable terms . . . it is the 
duty of the courts to give it effect. This 
is true unless considerations of equity and 
justice, or of public policy, dictate that 
the contract should not be enforced because 
of fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability, 
illegality or some other some cogent 
reason. (Martin v. Christensen, supra., at 
p. 295) . 
Under the standard of review enunciated in Martin v. 
Christensen, supra., the threshold question which must be 
addressed is whether or not the policy exclusion is stated 
clearly and unambiguously. This issue was apparently conceded 
by appellant in the court below. The contract language clearly 
requires a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle to "strike" the insured 
or the vehicle the insured is occupying as a condition precedent 
to respondent's duty to perform under the Uninsured Motorist 
Provision of the contract. 
Appellant contends that the term "hit-and-run" as 
used in the Uninsured Motorist Statute is ambiguous to the 
extent that it does not define whether physical contact must 
occur to constitute a "hitting". However, while the legislature 
failed to define the term until the 1986 session, the term has 
been defined in the contract of insurance to require a "striking". 
No argument is issued by appellant that the definition in the 
contract is ambiguous. Rather, they urge that the ambiguity in 
the statute should be resolved in their favor and that this 
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court should therefore hold that the policy fails to meet the 
statutory directive. While the legislative intent is no longer 
ambiguous, State Farm maintains that the construction urged by 
appellant would be erroneous even in the absence of the legisla-
tive directive. 
Initially, State Farm would invite the court to 
examine the logic of appellantfs argument. Marakis maintains 
that Utah law concerning vehicles leaving the scene of an 
accident, imposes criminal responsibility without the require-
ment of physical contact. Marakis therefore maintains that 
this court should construe the Uninsured Motorist Statute to 
apply in the same situations which would impose criminal 
liability. 
Respondent respectfully maintains that this logic is 
fallacious. An examination of the criminal statute cited by 
Marakis indicates that the legislature knew how to select 
appropriate terms in imposing legal duties based upon auto-
mobile accidents which did not involve physical contact. 
However, in the case of the Uninsured Motorist Statute, the 
legislature did not refer to Section 41-6-29, nor did the 
legislature use the term "involved in an accident", as they did 
in the criminal statute. Rather, they used the term "hit-
and-run" . 
Respondent would respectfully maintain that the fact 
that the legislature selected different terms indicates that 
the legislature intended the two status to apply to different 
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situations. To this extent, it is of course important to note 
that the term "hit" as used in the statute carries with it an 
obvious implication of physical contact. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court articulated this position in the case of Hayne v. Progres-
sive Northern Ins. Co,, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983). There the court 
stated: 
When statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, we must arrive at the legis-
lature 's intention by according the 
language its ordinary and accepted meaning, 
(citation omitted) In addition, we will 
not resort to extrinsic aids, such as 
legislative history, to construe the 
statute when the statute is clear on its 
face. (citation omitted) 
We conclude that the statutory language of 
sec. 632.32(4)(a)2b. Stats*, is unambiguous. 
We therefore arrive at the legislature's 
intent by according the language its common 
and accepted meaning. (citation omitted) 
As previously noted, the common and accepted 
meaning of the term 'hit-and-run' includes 
an element of physical contact. (Hayne v. 
Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra., pp. 
590-591). 
The Wisconsin court went on to state: 
Hayne (plaintiff) nevertheless argues that 
the term 'hit-and-run' . . . is not synonymous 
with physical contact. He cites two 
dictionary definitions and a decision from 
another jurisdiction to support his assertion 
that hit-and-run simply means an automobile 
involved in an accident, after which the 
driver flees the accident scene. 
We find his argument unpersuasive. The 
dictionary definitions we previously cited 
uniformly indicate that 'hit-and-run' 
includes two elements: a 'hit' or striking, 
-12-
and a 'run', or fleeing from the accident 
scene. (Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. 
Co., supra., p. 591). 
The Wisconsin court further indicated that ignoring 
the term "hit" would violate traditional principles of statutory 
construction. The court stated at page 591: 
Statutes must be construed, if possible, so 
that no word or clause is rendered surplusage, 
(citation omitted) If the legislature had 
intended its mandated uninsured motorist 
coverage to apply to any accident involving 
an unidentified motorist, as Hayne asserts, 
that result could have been reached merely 
by deleting the term 'hit-and-run' from the 
language in (the statute), and having that 
provision read: 'an unidentified motor 
vehicle involved in an accident'. (Hayne 
v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra., 
p. 591). 
The Utah legislature has now done exactly what the 
Wisconsin court suggested. They have specifically defined 
limited class of cases which may be pursued where physical 
contact is absent. However, in interpreting the prior statute, 
the persuasive logic of the Wisconsin court remains clear. It 
should not be assumed that the Utah legislature used the term 
"hit" when they meant something else. The more persuasive 
argument is that if they had intended uninsured motorist 
coverage to apply in situations where no physical contact 
existed, they could have used terms such as that in the new 
legislative amendment, the criminal statutes cited by appellant, 
or the language referred to by the Wisconsin court. 
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Finally, the court in Hayne, supra., takes appellant's 
argument one step further. Not only must we assume that the 
legislature was aware of the language used in other statutes 
(and that such language could be used in the present statutes), 
but we may also assume that the legislature is aware of a 
standard policy exclusion which is contained in nearly every 
policy of uninsured motorist insurance. The Hayne, supra., 
court continued at page 595: 
It is reasonable to assume that if the 
legislature was aware of the standard 
policy provision defining uninsured motor 
vehicle to include one involved in a 
1hit-and-run' accident, it was also aware 
of the standard policy provision defining 
'hit-and-run1 to include a physical contact 
requirement. (Hayne v. Progressive 
Northern Ins. Co., supra., p. 595). 
The Utah legislature's recent amendment clearly 
demonstrates that they are aware of the physical contact 
requirement, and believe that the requirement is proper except 
where the purpose of the requirement disappears. 
Finally, Marakis maintains that the exclusion is void 
as against public policy. Once again, respondent would maintain 
that the elected representatives of the Utah citizenry have 
articulated Utah's public policy on this issue and the recent 
amendment to the statute. Furthermore, the traditional meaning 
of the term "hit-and-run" as used in the Uninsured Motorist 
Statute would indicate that the legislature previously adopted 
the physical contact rule as Utah's public policy. No argument 
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has been stated that the legislature's directives in this 
regard are constitutionally repugnant. State Farm would 
respectfully maintain that the legislature having balanced the 
considerations inherent in the question, and having articulated 
a physical contact requirement, that the court should give 
effect to the language. 
However, State Farm would also address Marakis' 
characterization of the "majority rule" of our sister states on 
this issue. Appellant has gone to great efforts in an attempt 
to manufacturer a majority. In doing so, Marakis has been 
forced to divide the statutory schemes of the various states 
into four categories. The appellant then identifies one 
category, consisting of nine states, and applies that category 
to Utah's legislative scheme. 
Initially, it must be noted that in light of the 
clarification provided by the 1986 legislature, Utah no longer 
fits within the category assigned to it by appellant in her 
brief. The legislature in clarifying the statutes now places 
Utah within the fourth category identified by Marakis, in term 
the "most progressive" in appellant's brief. 
However, the manufacturing of a majority by segregation 
into statutory categories must receive further examination. As 
State Farm has previously indicated, the requirement is unambi-
guous in its terms, and is consistent with both the Uninsured 
Motorist Statute and the recent amendments providing clarifi-
cation concerning the physical contact requirement. Therefore, 
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the only remaining question is whether or not the requirement 
is so repugnant as to violate public policy, and under the Utah 
Supreme Court's standard stated in Martin v. Christensen, 
supra., would require the language to be ignored by the courts. 
In this regard, we should look beyond Marakis' categorizations 
of the various states. When we do this, we find that the 
majority of jurisdictions, either by legislative act or court 
determination, have embraced the physical contact requirement. 
Specifically, a state by state analysis shows that twenty-two 
states have adopted the physical contact requirement without 
exception. Another four states enforce the requirement except 
where clear and convincing corroborative evidence of the 
existence of the unidentified motor vehicle is present. 
Conversely, a minority of eighteen states permit recovery in 
the absence of physical contact. Only thirteen of the fifty 
states have permitted recovery without physical contact through 
judicial determination. Respondent is aware of no state court 
that has struck down an unambiguous legislative determination 
on the issue. 
It is therefore clear that the majority of jurisdic-
tions have not only found that the physical contact requirement 
does not violate public policy, but that indeed the requirement 
has been embraced as the public policy of the majority of 
states. Clearly then, the requirement does not reach the level 
of repugnance to equity and public policy referred to in Martin 
v. Christensen, supra. 
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Furthermore, while appellant has attempted to create 
a majority by categorizing other jurisdictions' decisions on 
the issue, they ignore the fact that few of the courts that 
have permitted recovery without physical contact have gone so 
far as the appellant urges the Utah court to go in this instance. 
Professor Alan I. Widiss in his 1985 treatise on uninsured 
motorist insurance, analyses the decisions requiring coverage 
as follows: 
Appellate cases which have allowed recovery 
when there was no physical contact could be 
grouped in several categories: 
(1) Decisions that extend the indirect 
contact doctrine (an example of this 
doctrine would be rocks kicked up by the 
wheels of a passing motorist); 
(2) Decisions that mitigate the effect of 
the 'physical contact' requirement by 
making its satisfaction a question of fact; 
and 
(3) Decisions that invalidate the 'physical 
contact' requirement. 
(A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured 
Motorist Insurance, Section 9.6, 2nd 
Edition, 1985). 
Therefore, in viewing the split of opinion between 
the various states, it is important to note that even the 
minority of states have in most instances refused to go to the 
extreme that plaintiff urges in the present case. By plain-
tiff's own admission, there was no "indirect contact" with the 
unidentified vehicle. Second, there is no "fact question" 
which would allow the jury to determine whether or not physical 
contact indeed occurred. 
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Because it is clear from an examination of appellant's 
brief that the majority of states have adopted the physical 
contact requirement through legislative or judicial action, 
respondent would refrain from excessive quotations from the 
statutes and case law of our sister states. However, for the 
benefit of the court, respondent attaches to the present brief 
as "Appendix B", citations to authorities in other jurisdic-
tions which have upheld the physical contact requirement. 
Finally, respondent would stress that important 
public policy considerations support the physical contact 
requirement as applied by the Utah state legislature. The 
legislature in several instances has indicated that it is the 
public policy of this state to effectuate a stabilization of 
automobile insurance. This court need not take judicial notice 
of the present "insurance crisis" which confronts the insurance 
consumer. That fact has been recognized by our legislature on 
many occasions. It is respectfully submitted that the legisla-
ture's delicate balancing has been proper in this instance. 
The physical contact rule will not bar claims where the exis-
tence of the unidentified vehicle can be clearly established. 
However, because of the possibility of fraudulent claims, but 
particularly the difficulties in defending actions where the 
only witness would be the plaintiff herself, the costs of such 
coverage could be expected to skyrocket. Naturally, as insu-
rance costs increase, the number of people who elect to go 
without insurance would also be expected to multiply. This is 
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particularly so in states like Utah which permit motorists to 
elect not to carry uninsured motorist protection. 
Obviously, it is the public policy of the State of 
Utah to provide insurance coverage for the innocent victims of 
tort feasors. However, that purpose will be frustrated if the 
costs of insurance protection becomes so prohibitive that more 
and more members of our populace are forced by economic cons-
traints to go without insurance. Faced with such a dilemma, it 
is respectfully submitted that the legislature may properly 
exercise its function by balancing the policy favoring compen-
sation for tort victims with the very real concern that to 
provide coverage for every possible instance of injury will 
make insurance costs so prohibitive that many citizens will be 
completely unprotected. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's 
determination as applied to the facts of this case is consistent 
with the legislative intent evidenced by the original Uninsured 
Motorist Statute, as well as the amendments provided by the 
1986 legislature. Furthermore, respondent would contend that 
the legislature has balanced competing public policy concerns 
and has adopted as the public policy of this state a fair and 
rational rule which permits for indemnification and appropriate 
circumstances while barring those claims which threaten to 
place the costs of insurance beyond the means of the citizenry. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial court, 
correctly discerning legislative intent and rejecting an 
overbroad public policy argument, properly enforced the contract 
between the parties. The fact that this case presents a 
question of contracts should be of no small consequence. As 
the Arizona court indicated in the case of Lawrence v. 
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 446 (1968): 
We find nothing misleading or ambiguous 
about the wording used in both policies to 
define 'hit-and-run automobile' or in 
setting out the requirement of physical 
contact. If we ignore or do away with the 
physical contact requirement we would be 
rewriting the contract between these 
parties, and would be rendering the phrase 
'hit-and-run' meaningless. 'Hit' in the 
ordinary sense requires some 'physical 
contact.' If this were not the case, and 
if we hold that no contact is required, 
then we would be rewriting the policy to 
have it contain 'miss-and-run automobile1 
coverage, or 'evasive action' coverage. We 
cannot expand the language used beyond its 
plain and ordinary meaning, nor should we 
add something to the contract which the 
parties have not put there. (Lawrence v. 
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co./ 
supra., p. 449) . 
The trial court having properly discerned legislative 
intent, having properly applied the public policy of the State 
of Utah, and having given force and effect to the clear and 
unambiguous requirements of the contract, respondent would 
respectfully request affirmance of its order granting summary 
judgment. 
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DATED AND SIGNED t h i s ty 
IVIE & YOUNG 
At to rneys f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
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"APPENDIX A" 
S. B. No. 91 
(5) When a covered person claims an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection [{3*)] (2) (b) proximately caused an accident without touching 
the covered person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, then the 
covered person shall show the existence of the other motor vehicle by clear 
and convincing evidence, which shall consist of more than the covered 
person* s testimony. 
[{6}—Hninsared-motorist-eoverage-may-not-be-eonstroed—to—require—an 
insurer?—as—to—any—one-poiieyj-to-pay-more-than-one-per-person-coverage 
iimit-to-any-one-eevered-persony-nor-to-pay—more—than—the—aggregate—or 
singie-iimit-coverage-iimits-in-connection-with-any-one-aeeident-] 
(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles be added together, combined, or 
stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an 
injured person for any one accident. If uninsured motorist coverage is 
available to an injured person under more than one insurance policy, the 
injured person shall elect the policy under which he desires to collect 
uninsured motorist benefits. Claimants are not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections* 
Section 158. Section 31A-22-306, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 
by Chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1985, is^amended to read: 
31A-22-306 (Effective 07/01/86). Personal injury protection under 
Subsection 31A-22-302 [43-)] (2) provides the coverages and benefits 
described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 
31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions 
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